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In July 1960 Edmundo Aguirre, a citizen of Mexico, applied
for an immigrant visa at the American Consulate General,
Tijuana, Mexico. In connection with his application, he delivered
to the appropriate consular officer an affidavit executed by
Anatalio T. Viloria in which the latter stated, among other things,
that "I am ready and willing to support the above named
[Aguirre] in the United States, and I guarantee that HE will not
become a public charge." The visa was issued, and Aguirre was
admitted to the United States in August 1960 where he worked
as a farm laborer until he contracted tuberculosis and was
admitted to a San Diego County hospital on November 6, 1964.
Because Aguirre could pay only a small portion of his hospital
costs, the county sued Viloria for the remainder claiming that his
affidavit of support legally bound him to pay any outstanding
charges on Aguirre's account. The trial court found that the
affidavit was a contract between Viloria and the federal
government on which the county could sue as a third-party
beneficiary and gave judgment for the county. The California
court of appeal reversed on the ground that the evidence did not
support the trial court's conclusion that the affidavit constituted
a contract. County of San Diego v. Viloria, 276 Adv. Cal. App.
437, 80 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1969).
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeal made no
reference to the appellate decision in County of San Diego v.
Arandal on which the trial court relied and which was argued by
the plaintiff on appeal. In Aranda the Appellate Department of
the Superior Court of San Diego found, on similar facts, that the
affidavit was a contract and allowed the county to recovery its
unpaid charges from the alien's sponsor.
The legal status of the affidavit is of some importance to
public agencies called upon to render services to alien immigrants
who become public charges because a finding of sponsor liability
1. No. 290,744 Super. Ct., June 17, 1965 (San Diego). While unreported, this case
is important because of its direct influence on San Diego County's sponsor collection
program, as outlined in n.26 infra.
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would provide them with additional possibilities of recovering
their costs. It would also have certain advantages for the federal
authorities administering immigration laws, as will be pointed out
later in this discussion.
The entry of aliens into the United States is governed by the
Immigration and Nationality Act 2 which requires any alien
wishing to reside or work in the United States to obtain an
immigrant visa from an American consular officer outside of the
country.3 He then presents his visa at the port of entry to the
appropriate immigration officer who officially admits him into
the United States.4 In the performance of their duties, the consular
and immigration officials must consider whether the alien is
eligible for a visa and for admission into the United States under
the Immigration and Nationality Act. Among the various
grounds of ineligibility set forth in the Act, they must consider
section 212(a)(15)5 which states that aliens are ineligible to receive
visas and shall be excluded from admission to the United States
who:
.. .in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of
application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney
General at the time of application for admission, are likely at
any time to become public charges.6
Any conclusion that an alien is ineligible under this section
must be "predicated upon circumstances which indicate that the
alien will probably become a charge upon the public after entry
into the United States." 17 The consular officer may know of
specific factors, such as a particular illness which might bar the
alien under the public charge provision, but general evidence as to
the alien's financial circumstances may also give rise to the
ineligibility.5 Thus, the consular officer considers all relevant
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1964).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964). Visa issuance and denial is the responsibility of the
consular officer and is not subject to review by the Secretary of State. 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a)
(1964). See also Rosenfeld, Consular Non-reviewability, 41 A.B.A.J. 1109 (1955), C.
GORDON and M. ROSENFELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, §§ 1.11, 1.12b, 8.21
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Gordon].
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1964).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15) (1964).
6. Id.
7. 22 C.F.R. § 42.91(a)(15)(i) (1969).
8. For example, it is impossible to predict whether an apparently healthy alien will
contract a specific disease and become incapacitated. However, his financial situation may
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public charge evidence including the alien's personal resources and

employment possibilities, as well as any affidavit or public charge
bond submitted by a sponsor.'
The sponsor is a third party to the visa transaction who
vouches for the alien's responsibility by expressing his willingness
to aid the alien should the latter encounter financial difficulties.

Consular officers have generally required such assurances from
sponsors since 1930, and the document submitted for
consideration is known generally as the affidavit of support.,"

There is no specified language or format for the affidavit," and
any statements of a promissory or contractual nature are
voluntary.
Because the wording of the affidavit often indicates that the

sponsor pledges himself to aid the alien when necessary after the
latter's admission to the United States, confusion has arisen as to
the binding nature of the document. This matter was not
examined directly until the end of the 1950's in Department of
Mental Hygiene v. ReneP2 and State ex rel. Attorney General v.
Binder. 3 In both cases the public agencies concerned sought to
recover from the sponsor the funds expended on the alien on the

basis of the sponsor's affidavit of support. 4 The Renel and Binder
be so precarious that any adverse circumstance would be likely to render him dependent
on public assistance. See also United States v. Lipkis, 56 F. 427 (D.C.N.Y. 1893) where
an immigrant admitted with a public charge bond later became insane and was placed in
a public institution. The court allowed the government to recover on the bond even though
the specific illness of insanty was not contemplated at the time the bond was taken.
9. The author writes from personal experience as a consular officer. The material in
this article relating to the consular officer has been reviewed for its applicability to present
procedures by J. Keith Powell, United States Consul, who is Chief of the Visa Section,
American Consulate General, Tijuana, Mexico.
10. GORDON at § 2.39e.
11. A sample affidavit constructed by Gordon and Rosenfeld may be found in
GORDON at § 10.8b(l). Note that the Immigration Service prescribes an affidavit form
for its adjustment of status cases. The form, 1-134, does not contain contractual language.
GORDON at § 10.8a(21). Department of State Form Letter DSL-845, 12-67, available
from the Visa Office, Department of State, explains what evidence may be submitted to
consular officers to establish eligibility under the public charge provision. It states that no
prescribed forms exist for the affidavit.
12. 8 Misc. 2d 615, 167 N.Y.S.2d 22 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957), affd 10 Misc. 2d 402,
173 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1958), affd 6 N.Y. 2d 791, 159 N.E. 2d 678,
188 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1959).
13. 356 Mich. 73, 96 N.W.2d 140 (1959).
14. The affidavit in Renel is typical and said in part:
That we are willing and able to receive, maintain and support the aliens after
their immigration to the United States, and hereby assume such obligations
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courts concluded, however, that the federal government had no
intention of entering into a contract because Congress had given

the government no authority to make or require a contract in visa
cases.'-

In 1965 the Appellate Department of the Superior Court in
San Diego rejected the reasoning in Renel and Binder and found
that the consular officer could enter into a contract under his

broad authority to administer the pertinent provisions of the
immigration law. The court examined four cases in which the

actions of various government officials, while not specifically
authorized by law, were upheld by courts under the general

authority granted by law to perform relevant official functions.
In the case of In re Day 6 the Commissioner of Immigration
denied entry to persons arriving from England on grounds that
they were likely to become public charges. The court found that
the Commissioner had general authority to determine the public

charge question and implied that he could set reasonable
standards, including the furnishing of sufficient sponsors or other

guarantees, in the exercise of his duties.1 7 Thus, even though
specific guarantees were not authorized by statute, the general

provision that immigration authorities might require a guarantee
was approved.
In Earle v. United States" the court considered the legality

of a bond exacted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
While no statute authorized the specific type of bond in question,

the court concluded that:
[U]nder the broad authority granted to regulate the admission
guaranteeing that none of them will at any time become public charges upon
any community in the United States .
8 Misc. 2d at 616, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
15. The Appellate Term in Renel noted:
ITihe record shows that the State Department has consistently refused to take
a stand on whether the affidavit is an enforceable agreement, showing that this
is a matter for the courts. . . . If the consuls had no authority to require a
contractual promise, it was because the Congress had given them none and the
understanding of Congress must be the controlling interpretation.
10 Misc. 2d at 405, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36. The Binder court concluded:
There being no such act of Congress empowering immigration officials to
make or require such a contract for the United States Government, it can
scarcely be concluded that there was an intent on the part of the Government
to create a contract obligation.
356 Mich. at 78, 96 N.W. 2d at 143. See also Corcoran, The Executor and the Affidavit
of Support of an Immigrant'sSponsor, 54 ILL. B.J. 1066 (1966).
16. 27 F. 678 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
17. Id. at 681.
18. 254 F.2d 384 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 358 U.S. 822 (1958).
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of nonimmigrants, the exaction of the bond was within the
powers inherent in the grant even in the absence of express
statutory authority. The bond here, being neither unlawful nor
prohibited, is entirely valid and enforceable.19
In United States v. Tingey0 the Court examined the effect of
a surety bond given to the Navy Department by a purser. The
purser contended the bond was void because the requirement of
the bond was not authorized by law or regulation. However, the
Court held that the bond was valid since the right to require it was
incident to the duties of the department, and "the United States
having a political capacity to take it, we see no objection to its
validity in a moral or a legal view."'"
In Moses v. United StateS2 the Court upheld a bond required
without siatutory authority, finding that so long as the demand
for the bond was not contrary to law the bond was valid,
approving the rule of the Tingey case.23
After considering those four cases, the Appellate Department
in Aranda concluded:
Since 8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1182(15) provides in part that an alien,
who in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of
application for a visa or in the opinion of the Attorney General
at the time of application for admission is likely to become a
public charge, is ineligible for entry, it would appear to us that
in the case before us the affidavit was not exacted from the
defendants illegally or unlawfully and it would appear to have
been given voluntarily to induce the consul to permit entry of
[the alien]. Under the rationale of the Day, Tingey, Moses and
Earle cases, supra, the agreement entered into between
defendants and the consul would be lawful and binding at least
between the United States Department of Immigration and the
defendants. This is the more reasonable and sensible view of
the duty and authority of a consul admitting an alien, and we
therefore do not feel bound to follow the reasoning set forth
24
in the Renel (N.Y.) and Binder (Mich.) cases, supra.
19. Id.at 387. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a) (1964) authorizes the requirement of a bond to
assure an alien's timely departure from the country. In Earle the alien violated her visitor
status by accepting employment but departed within the time allowed. The Immigration
Service declared the bond forfeit for the violation of status. The sponsor sought to recover
on the theory that no authority existed for a maintenance-of-status bond as opposed to a
timely-departure bond.
20. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115 (1831).
21. Id.at 128.
22. 166 U.S. 571 (1897).
23. Id. at 586.
24. No. 290,744, Super. Ct. June 17, 1965 at 6.
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The court also found that the County of San Diego was a
third party beneficiary of the agreement and should recover the
reasonable value of the hospital services rendered to the alien.
Sufficient consideration was found because the defendants
obtained entry of the alien "upon the representations made in the
25
affidavit."
While Aranda argues in favor of the consular officer's
contractual authority, it appears from the opinion that the court
was considering a bilateral contract. However, a similar case
might have been made on the theory of a unilateral contract. The
sponsor submits his affidavit and agrees to do certain things in
return for performance, i.e., the issuance of the visa. He expects
his representations to induce action on the part of the consular
officer. If the visa is issued in reliance thereon, as is evidenced by
the inclusion of the affidavit with the file accompanying the issued
visa, the sponsor's obligations become operative. The consular
officer does not bind the federal government to any action, but he
accepts the affidavit and relies on it in making his determination.
The Renel and Binder arguments regarding the consular officer's
contractual authority have less weight in this situation because
there is no doubt as to the officer's authority to rely on or reject
all public charge evidence. Arguably, the sponsor should be bound
to his agreement by the intended result.2
Unlike Aranda, the Viloria opinion had little to say about
contractual authority. Instead, the court tended to concentrate on
the intention of the parties to the transaction in concluding that
no contract existed. The court first noted the Renel and Binder
decisions, the case of United States ex rel Smith v. Curran,z7 the
25. Id. at 9.
26. The Aranda decision provided a basis for the implementation of a vigorous
sponsor collection program in San Diego County. At this writing, the County policy is to
limit the sponsor's liability to the first five years of an alien's residence in the United
States. Recovery of assistance costs is limited to those incurred by the individual alien
sponsored, and sponsors are to be notified quickly when aliens apply for assistance. County
Board of Supervisors, Action Item No. 104, April 14, 1969, in San Diego County Welfare
Department Misc. File 6. The County's action in the matter of sponsor liabilty was partly
responsible for the introduction in the United States Senate of bill S.3772 requiring public
charge bonds of most immigrants from the Western Hemisphere. 114 CONG. REC., 20832
(1968).
27. 12 F.2d 636 (2nd Cir. 1926). In Curran, the aliens arrived at New York destined
to relatives in Oregon. These relatives could not be uncovered but later ostensible relatives
in Brooklyn appeared, one with an affidavit of support. The aliens were excluded because
the immigrant visas were found to be forged and because they were likely public charges.
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sections of law under which consular officers operate, a 1958 Visa
Office Bulletin describing the affidavit of support and the
provisions of the law applicable to public charge bonds and
concluded that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
affidavit dictated the finding that the parties did not intend the
creation of a contract.
The Renel and Binder cases were cited as holding that the
execution of the affidavit of support "was not intended to create
a legal obligation, and imposed only a moral obligation." 8 The
court also said that the "legislative history of the immigration
laws, as noted in the decisions in those cases, reflects an intention
the execution of the affidavit does not impose a legal obligation
....

*"29

The court did not refer to the matter of the consular

officer's contractual authority, and it made no mention of the
Aranda case in this regard. However, since contractual authority
weighed so heavily in the Renel and Binder opinions, it could be
inferred that Viloria gives at least tacit approval to the
proposition that consular officers have no such authority in
immigrant visa matters.
The court cited the Curran case as holding that the offer of
a relative to care for an alien, contained in an affidavit of support,
did not require a finding that the alien was not likely to become
a public charge where the relative was not one upon whom the
alien had a legal claim for support. Inherent in this holding, said
the court, was the conclusion that the affidavit did not create a
legal claim, 3° and thus for the Viloria court the Curran decision
"dictated the conclusion" that affidavits do not create legal
claims for support.31 The Curran fact situation can be
distinguished from that in Viloria since the question of the legal
effect of the affidavit was not before the court. In Curran the
court was considering the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon
by the immigration authorities to exclude two aliens 2 Insofar as
The court said that the immigration board was justified in considering the statement about
the relatives in Oregon false and the use of the affidavit by the relatives in New York to
be an attempted fraud. As far as the affidavit was concerned, the court said merely that
assistance offered by a person under no legal duty of support does not require a finding
of eligibility. 12 F.2d at 638. It should be noted that assistance offered by a person who
is under a legal duty of support likewise does not require a finding of eligibility.
28. 276 Adv. Cal. App. at 441-42, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
29. Id. at 444, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
30. Id. at 443, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
31. Id. at 444, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
32. See n.27 supra.
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the opinion relates to the affidavit there is no information as to
whether it was submitted on a form prescribed by the
government-for example, one similar to the present Form I134 33-or whether the sponsor submitted it in his own language,
and whether in either case it contained contractual language. In
any event, the fraud attempted by the sponsors in that case
seriously undermined the evidentiary value of the affidavit
regardless of any obligations it may or may not have imposed. As
far as the affidavit is concerned, therefore, Curran could be taken
as merely indicating that immigration officials are not required to
accept any affidavit of support submitted on behalf of an alien.
The Viloria court found further evidence of. lack of any
contractual intent in the rules and regulations under which
consular officers operate, as well as a 1958 Visa Office Bulletin
describing the affidavit of support3 The court concluded that the
affidavit was merely evidence on the public charge issue, being of
limited value when given "by a person not related to the applicant
' 35
in that degree imposing a legal obligation to support.
The court noted that even though the consular officer is "of
the opinion the applicant is likely to become a public charge," he
may be admitted to the United States upon posting of a public
charge bond in an amount and on conditions approved by the
Attorney General "which unequivocally creates legal
obligations. '36 This conclusion is misleading as to the consular
officer who may issue a visa only if he is "satisfied that the giving
of such bond or undertaking removes the alien's ineligibilit3i to
receive a visa" under the public charge .provision of the Act 7
Thus, an alien who in any case will probably become a public
charge cannot receive an immigrant visa regardless of the
33. See n. IIsupra.
34. 276 Adv. Cal. App. at 442-43, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 873. The court described the
bulletin as stating that an affidavit in itself would not establish eligibility under the public
charge provision, that the evidentiary value of an affidavit depended upon the sponsor's
relationship with the alien, that a financially responsible person with a legal obligation to
support the alien, as a rule, could give an affidavit which would be satisfactory evidence
overcoming the public charge possibility, and that an affidavit by a casual friend or distant
relative with little or no personal knowledge of the alien "will have limited, if any probative
value."
35. 276 Adv. Cal. App. at 443, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
36. Id. at 444, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 873. Bonds are authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g)
(1964), and they accrue to the benefit of the public agencies of the jurisdiction in which
the alien becomes a public charge. 8 U.S.C. § 1183 (1964).
37. 22 C.F.R. 42.91 (a)(15)(ii) (1969).
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existence of a bond. In the final analysis, the bond, like the
affidavit, is merely evidentiary material, the difference in value
being at most one of degree. At a later point in the opinion, the
court noted that the following factors mitigate against any
contractual intent by the sponsor or the federal government on the
affidavit:
[T]he fact the alien is not a party to the alleged contract; is
not obligated to do anything which would prevent his
becoming a public charge; in nowise is subject to the control
of the sponsor; may refuse employment offered him by the
sponsor; may neglect his health to the extent he contracts a
disabling disease; and in a variety of other ways may so
conduct himself that he will become a public charge?9

These factors apply with equal validity when the sponsor submits
a public charge bond. Thus, a person who admittedly intends to
create legal obligations by posting a bond finds himself with the
same lack of control over the alien as the person who submits an
affidavit of support.
The Viloria court next considered the confusion and
ambiguity it found inherent in the language of the affidavit. The
writing was not entitled "contract" or "agreement" but merely
"affidavit," it was signed only by the defendant, and it did not
recite or disclose a consideration. The trial court found it at one
point to be a "contract of continuing guarantee," but the findings
did not reveal what obligation was guaranteed. Other findings of
the trial court were found to be premised on a contract of
warranty rather than guarantee, and if such was the intent of the
parties, the circumstances surrounding the transaction presented
an "unsurmountable aura of confusion and uncertainty."3 The
court questioned whether the parties contemplated factors not
existing at the time of the application, whether the warranty
would extend to factors over which the sponsor had no control,
and whether it was reasonable to conclude that the parties
contemplated a legal obligation which varied from state to state.
In the light of the confusion surrounding the scope and nature of
the obligation, the court concluded that the trial court's finding
that a contract existed was not supported by the evidence.
The Viloria opinion amply underscores a key item with
regard to the defendant's affidavit. There is no statement as to the
38. 276 Adv. Cal. App. at 447, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
39. Id. at 446, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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duration of the sponsor's liability for the alien nor is there any
limitation expressed as to the amount of liability. It seems that
courts are reluctant to enforce such unlimited obligations except
on the clearest expression of intent. It is unreasonable to assume
that most sponsors would wish to assume liability for an
indeterminate number of years and at the possible risk of their
own solvency. These factors, left unresolved in Viloria's affidavit,
are perhaps the basic cause of the confusion which the court found
in the case.
It is evident that sponsors submit their documents for the
consular officer's information and consideration. The latter is
entitled to rely, and does rely to a greater or lesser extent, on the
statements presented to him. It seems illogical, therefore, that a
sponsor can be allowed to escape the responsibility of his
representations. The public charge bond, of course, does impose
liability, but it is burdened with a somewhat cumbersome
procedure, and it ties up the sponsor's funds even when the alien
has not become a public charge. The affidavits, being easier to
prepare and generally more flexible, allow for faster processing of
visa cases, which benefits all interested parties including the
sponsor and the government, while at the same time permitting
the sponsor the use of his funds until the alien becomes a public
charge.
There is a need for an instrument combining the flexibility of
the affidavit with the firm legal obligations of the public charge
bond. Such an instrument would help to discourage frivolous and
indiscriminate sponsoring of immigrants, American consular
officers would have more reliable evidence upon which to make
their decisions on the public charge question, and public agencies
would have a better chance of recovering funds expended on
resident aliens. The matter of the government's contractual
authority and intent, however, must be resolved. This might be
accomplished through some combination of legislative action and
clear statements of intent by the federal agencies concerned. In
addition, the document itself should set forth the conditions under
which the obligation is imposed. 0 If these requirements can be
40. The following statement is submitted as an example of the type of language which
might meet judicial objections to the uncertainty of any obligation assumed in the normal
affidavit of support: "In consideration of the granting of the application of (the alien or
aliens) for an immigrant visa, I hereby guarantee that if any of said aliens at any time
after subsequent lawful admission to he United States as permanent residents becomes a
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met, the result will be a smoother operation of the immigration

procedures, increased sponsor responsibility and, hopefully, a
decline in the number of aliens seeking public welfare assistance
in the United States.
ROBERT

A. MAUTINO

public charge, I will pay to the United States or to any State, Territory, county, town,
muncipality, or district thereof, upon whom any of said aliens shall become a public
charge, any and all charges or expenses not in excess of (amount) for each of any such
aliens, arising therefrom whatsoever the cause may be and whether it arises prior to or
subsequent to arrival of any such aliens into the United States. Notwithstanding any
obligation incurred by me by reason of this affidavit of support and any payment made
pursuant to the terms hereof, this obligation shall remain in full force and effect as to the
remainder of the liability of this obligation for the life of each of such aliens or until this
obligation or any part thereof shall have been canceled at the discretion of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, or until such time as each of such aliens may depart
permanently from the United States or becomes a naturalized citizen thereof; and it is
further agreed that suit to enforce the obligation under this affidavit of support may be
instituted for and on behalf and in the name of the United States, or any State, Territory,
county, town, municipality, or district thereof upon whom any of said aliens shall become
a public charge."

